As Ontario continues to expand its $10-a-day child care system, ensuring that public funding supports high-quality, affordable child care is more important than ever. Research has consistently shown that not-for-profit and publicly operated child care centres tend to provide higher-quality care than for-profit centres. However, simply being incorporated as a not-for-profit does not necessarily mean that an organization operates without opportunities for private financial gain.
The Growing Concern About “Fake Not-for-Profits”
A growing concern in Canada’s child care sector is the use of “fake not-for-profits”: organizations that are legally incorporated as not-for-profit but are structured in ways that allow private individuals or businesses to financially benefit from their operations.
For example, a for-profit child care operator may establish a separate not-for-profit organization while continuing to own the building where the child care centre operates. The not-for-profit then pays rent to the operator’s private company. Similar arrangements can involve purchasing equipment, food, staffing or administrative services from businesses connected to the organization’s directors or operators. In this way, money can flow from a not-for-profit organization to private businesses without being distributed directly as profits.
These arrangements are not new. Martha Friendly in her May 2025 report, Deconstructing “Fake Non-Profit” Child Care in Canada, documents concerns about such practices dating back several decades. However, they have become particularly relevant under the Canada-wide Early Learning and Child Care (CWELCC) system, which prioritizes public and not-for-profit child care expansion. This creates an incentive for some private operators to establish not-for-profit organizations to access funding intended for that expansion.
Ontario’s Not-for-Profit Corporations Act, 2010 (ONCA) prohibits improper distributions of profits, but its conflict-of-interest rules can allow these arrangements to continue. Under section 41 of ONCA, a director or officer who has a financial interest in a significant contract or transaction with the not-for-profit must disclose that interest. The transaction may still proceed if it is fair and reasonable to the organization and receives the required approval. The board of directors can approve it after the financial interest is disclosed, or the organization’s members can approve it through a special resolution after being informed of the interest, provided the director or officer acts honestly and in good faith. If the applicable requirements are met, the director or officer may keep the financial benefit received from the transaction.
How Toronto’s Rules Better Protect Not-for-Profit Child Care
Toronto’s Declaration of Not-for-Profit Compliance closes this gap by prohibiting organizations subject to its requirements from renting property to or from directors, officers or connected persons, regardless of whether the conflict is disclosed and the agreement approved. Toronto also restricts purchases from connected businesses, lending and borrowing money, and other transactions that financially benefit directors or officers. These protections extend to certain family members and connected companies, making it harder to redirect money through someone else.
Toronto also strengthens oversight by requiring at least five directors instead of Ontario’s three, prohibiting employees from serving on boards and requiring directors to serve without remuneration. Its rules also ensure that remaining assets upon dissolution go to eligible charities or public benefit corporations with similar purposes in Ontario, rather than potentially being distributed to members.
The key difference is that ONCA allows directors to benefit financially from certain transactions with the not-for-profit organizations they oversee, as long as the legal requirements are met. Toronto places stricter limits on these financial relationships, prohibiting many of these transactions to better protect not-for-profit child care funding from private financial interests.
As Ontario expands its $10-a-day child care system, these safeguards are essential to protecting public funding. Other Service System Managers should follow Toronto’s lead, and Ontario should establish consistent protections to ensure funding intended for not-for-profit child care supports children, families and educators rather than private financial interests.
Further Reading: How Ontario’s Legislation Compares with Toronto’s Requirements
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Requirement |
Ontario’s ONCA |
Toronto’s Additional Requirements |
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Financial benefits from transactions |
Under section 41, directors or officers may retain financial benefits from certain transactions if the conflict of interest is disclosed, the transaction is fair and reasonable, and the applicable approval requirements are met. |
Prohibits transactions that directly or indirectly confer financial benefits on directors or officers. |
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Renting property |
Does not automatically prohibit renting property to or from a director, officer or their business. Such arrangements may proceed if ONCA’s conflict-of-interest requirements are satisfied. |
Prohibits renting property to or from directors, officers or connected persons. |
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Purchasing and selling goods or services |
Does not automatically prohibit transactions involving directors, officers or their businesses. Material transactions involving conflicts of interest are subject to section 41. |
Prohibits purchasing goods or services from directors, officers or connected persons unless there is only one available source within a reasonable distance. Prohibits selling goods or services to them, except child care services. |
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Lending and borrowing money |
Does not automatically prohibit lending money to or borrowing money from directors, officers or their businesses. Material transactions involving conflicts of interest are subject to section 41. |
Prohibits lending money to or borrowing money from directors, officers or connected persons. |
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Connected persons and businesses |
Section 41 requires directors and officers to disclose certain financial interests they have in contracts or transactions involving other individuals or businesses. |
Extends restrictions to specified family members and connected businesses, including certain corporations in which directors, officers or connected persons hold more than 10% of voting rights. |
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Board composition |
Requires at least three directors (s. 22). Employees may serve as directors, although employees of a public benefit corporation or its affiliates cannot make up more than one-third of its board (s. 23(3)). |
Requires at least five directors and prohibits employees from serving as directors. |
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Director remuneration |
Directors may receive remuneration for serving as directors, subject to the corporation’s articles and by-laws. Directors, officers and members may also receive reasonable remuneration for services performed in another capacity (s. 47). |
Directors must serve without remuneration but may be reimbursed for reasonable expenses incurred in performing their duties. |
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Distribution of assets upon dissolution |
Public benefit corporations must distribute remaining assets to eligible recipients. Corporations that are not public benefit corporations may distribute remaining assets to members, depending on their articles (s. 150). |
After payment of debts and liabilities, remaining assets must be transferred to an eligible registered charity or public benefit corporation with similar purposes operating solely in Ontario. |
Sources
Friendly, Martha (2025). Deconstructing “Fake Non-Profit” Child Care in Canada: What Is It and What Isn’t It? What Should the Response Be Under the $10-a-Day Plan? Childcare Resource and Research Unit.
Bryan, Valerie, Thomas Charters and Leanne Findlay (2024). Structural Characteristics of Quality Child Care Services. Statistics Canada / Employment and Social Development Canada.
Childcare Resource and Research Unit (2011). What Research Says About Quality in For-Profit, Non-Profit and Public Child Care.
Not-for-Profit Corporations Act, 2010, S.O. 2010, c. 15, particularly sections 23, 41, 47, 89 and 150.
City of Toronto, Declaration of Not-for-Profit Compliance.